russian electronic warfare
As the U.S. looks to the future, some capabilities it may need to invest in include “penetrating” jammers, such as fifth-generation stealthy aircraft, that can stay out of range of Russian EW equipment and surface-to-air missiles. Russian EW improvements include electronic warfare systems addressing the full spectrum of threats, “from NATO ships to missiles to future hypersonic weapons," according to Sputnik News. This site uses Akismet to reduce spam. [XXVII] McLeary, 2018, “Russia Winning Info & Electronic War”. The Russian Krasukha-2 electronic warfare (EW) system is designed to jam airborne early warning aircraft radar from as far away as 250 kilometers (155 miles). The Russian R-330Zh Zhitel electronic warfare system has been repeatedly spotted in the occupied part of the Ukrainian Donbas. Russia To Supply Myanmar With Orlan-10E Surveillance Drones And Pantsir-S1. Moscow prefers to rely on local proxies to do the brunt of the fighting: Moscow has made increasing use of allied irregular forces and private mercenary companies to lead operations in Ukraine and Syria, bolstered by Russian advisors, military equipment and training. A Russian serviceman prepares to launch a drone during a military exercise. This can also be thought of as the reconnaissance element of EW. “Electronic warfare often deals with degrading the enemy’s sensor and weapons systems. [XXV] Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., 2018, “HASC EW Expert Bacon: US ‘Not Prepared’ for Electronic Warfare vs. Russia, China,” January 2018, Breaking Defense, https://breakingdefense.com/2018/01/hasc-ew-expert-bacon-us-not-prepared-for-electronic-warfare-vs-russia-china/. Local proxies free up conventional Russian military units and assets to intervene in the sectors they are most needed. Here's What You Need to Remember: Western militaries depend on extensive command-and-control infrastructure and near real-time tracking of troop positions as force multipliers. It periodically featured both in the OSCE SMM reports and in the photographs that InformNapalm volunteer intelligence community published in the course of their OSINT investigations.This system entered service with the Russian army in 2008, and the Russian … Committee on the Armed Services. [III] Thomas Grove, 2019, “The New Iron Curtain: Russian Missile Defense Challenges U.S. Air Power,” The Wall Street Journal, January 2019. https://www.wsj.com/articles/russias-missile-defense-draws-a-new-iron-curtain-against-u-s-military-11548255438. In fact, its so-called “New-Generation” or “Fourth-Generation” warfare is founded on a recognition that old Soviet-era “Deep Battle” tactics emphasizing huge armored formations deploying to battle in echelon were no longer viable given Russia’s more limited resources compared to the Soviet Red Army, as well as its persistent qualitative inferiority. Jamming is a key tool in electronic attack, and one that is commonly referenced in EW literature. The system, based on KamAZ-5350 6×6 trucks, was spotted with Russian peacekeepers in Artsakh in a video that was shared by Global News on November 14. The U.S. Army’s Asymmetric Warfare Group was formed in 2006 to identify gaps in U.S. military doctrine, equipment and field tactics, and to study how potential adversaries are developing tactics to exploit them. [XXX] Freedberg, Jr., 2018, “HASC EW Expert”, [XXXI] Freedberg, Jr., 2018 “Electronic Warfare Trumps Cyber”, [XXXII] Loren Thompson, 2016, “The Evolution of Jet Fighters Takes a Giant Leap with ‘Fifth-Generation’ Planes,” Forbes, June 2016, https://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2016/06/01/what-makes-a-jet-fighter-fifth-generation/#5a89f9b66655, [XXXIII] Freedberg, Jr., 2018, “Electronic Warfare Trumps Cyber”. Troops in Syria,” Foreign Policy, July 2018, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/07/30/russian-jamming-poses-a-growing-threat-to-u-s-troops-in-syria/. Its purpose is to deny an adversary from gaining control of, and an advantage in, the electromagnetic (EM) spectrum, while still ensuring friendly and unimpeded access for oneself and one’s allies. [X] Kjellen, 2018, “Russian Electronic Warfare,” p. 30. The Role of Electronic Warfare in the Russian Armed Forces, and considers that the above descriptions are enormous simplifications. These sniper fronts can pin down larger enemy formations with accurate fire — then call down artillery strikes on the immobilized enemy to inflict even greater casualties. Russia’s electronic warfare specialists will practice creating ‘protection areas’ in the country’s airspace that could render foreign satellite navigation systems completely useless, disabling an enemy’s high-precision weapons. Borisoglebsk 2 . Sputnik International News. Russia may also be working on a capability to perform electronic warfare (EW) from space. Meanwhile in Syria, there is often uncertainty as to whether any given attack directed against civilian targets was perpetrated by Syrian or Russian forces. [II] Although the U.S. continues to possess military superiority in conventional weapons, Moscow now possesses a critical asymmetrical advantage that seeks to bridge this gap. Click to share on Twitter (Opens in new window), Click to share on Facebook (Opens in new window), Beyond Huawei – 5G and US National Security, In Historic Trilateral Summit, the U.S., Russia, and Israel Focus on Mutual Interests, © 2021 Georgetown Security Studies Review, https://www.wsj.com/articles/russias-missile-defense-draws-a-new-iron-curtain-against-u-s-military-11548255438, https://www.ausa.org/articles/russia-gives-lessons-electronic-warfare, https://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-12.pdf, https://static1.squarespace.com/static/566ef8b4d8af107232d5358a/t/5c99488beb39314c45e782da/1553549492554/Above+Us+Only+Stars.pdf, https://breakingdefense.com/2018/02/electronic-warfare-trumps-cyber-for-deterring-russia/, http://cimsec.org/cutting-fog-reflexive-control-russian-stratcom-ukraine/20156, https://breakingdefense.com/2018/10/russia-winning-information-electronic-war-over-syria-us-uk-generals-warn/, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/07/30/russian-jamming-poses-a-growing-threat-to-u-s-troops-in-syria/, https://breakingdefense.com/2018/01/hasc-ew-expert-bacon-us-not-prepared-for-electronic-warfare-vs-russia-china/, https://taskandpurpose.com/pentagon-russia-electronic-warfare, https://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2016/06/01/what-makes-a-jet-fighter-fifth-generation/#5a89f9b66655, The U.S. Military’s Greatest Contemporary Adversary: COVID-19. However, Russian electronic-warfare batteries wield a multitude of systems to jam or spy upon frontline communication systems — including radio, cellular, satellite and even GPS. [IV] Col. Liam Collins, 2018, “Russia Gives Lessons in Electronic Warfare,” Association of the United States Army, July 2018, https://www.ausa.org/articles/russia-gives-lessons-electronic-warfare. [XI] Thomas, 2016, Russian Military Strategy, p. 156. Russia’s Krasukha-2 EW system also possesses the ability to analyze signal types and then jam adversary’s radar. © Copyright 2021 Center for the National Interest All Rights Reserved, 5 Places World War III Could Start in 2018, This Is What Happens if America Nuked North Korea. Mi-8MTPR-1 electronic warfare helicopter (Picture source: Army Recognition) The Mi-8MTPR-1 is a standard Mi-8MTV-5-1 with a ‘Rychag-AV’ active jamming station installed onboard. This unique electronic warfare system is designed to protect command posts, groups of troops, air defence systems, and important industrial and military-political centres from detection by enemy radars. By 2020, Russian Electronic Warfare forces plan to update more than 60 percent of their equipment. Russia deliberately transmits the same signals on frequencies used by GNSS in an effort to prevent receivers from locking-on to the authentic GNSS signals. Today, EW has become integral to Russia’s approach to warfare in the modern era, where it has gained extensive experience in Ukraine and Syria. Finally, Russia uses the proxies to deny the involvement of their own forces, confusing the reactions of its adversaries. Among major accomplishments for the Russian defense industry was the delivery to the military of the latest electronic warfare (EW) systems—“Vitebsk,” “Krasuha” and “Moskva.” We have to catch up…[EW] is an area that we’re behind our adversaries, we’re not moving fast…we’ve just lost so much capability.”[XXIX] The U.S. currently has too few EW assets, with many of them being old and outdated compared to Russia. Hearing on Readying the U.S. Military for Future Warfare. Its role is to disrupt mobile satellite communications and satellite-based navigation signals (GPS), basically jamming of HF/UHF (both terrestrial and aircraft) radio channels and GPS. Russian Electronic Warfare System Is Capable Of Neutralizing GPS, Galileo and BeiDou Systems. As reported "News" with reference to the military department, the Baltic and Northern fleets of the Russian Federation took part in the testing. Learn how your comment data is processed. The first is the Borisoglebsk-2, a system designed to jam mobile satellite communications and radio-navigational units. Western militaries depend on extensive command-and-control infrastructure and near real-time tracking of troop positions as force multipliers. [XX] Paul McLeary, 2018, “Russia Winning Info & Electronic War in Syria, US & UK Generals Warn,” Breaking Defense, 2018, https://breakingdefense.com/2018/10/russia-winning-information-electronic-war-over-syria-us-uk-generals-warn/. Remarkably, it is Russia that presents some of the stiffest competition, with increasing agreement among experts in the field that Russia has taken a huge, and somewhat unexpected, leap forward in its EW capabilities. Russian Electronic Warfare Systems on the ground. [XXIX] Jared Keller, 2019, “The Pentagon is Reportedly Getting Serious about Electronic Warfare,” Task & Purpose, June 2019, https://taskandpurpose.com/pentagon-russia-electronic-warfare. [XVIII] Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., 2018, “Electronic Warfare Trumps Cyber for Deterring Russia,” Breaking Defense, February 2018, https://breakingdefense.com/2018/02/electronic-warfare-trumps-cyber-for-deterring-russia/. While Russia frequently asserts its supremacy in the field of EW, this time it might actually be true. Electronic warfare is a relatively inexpensive way to curb an opponent’s ability to communicate and exercise control within a battlespace. This was especially evident in the conflict in Ukraine, when the government’s reaction was initially paralyzed by uncertainty as to whether it faced a Russian invasion or a purely local uprising. House. With contract servicemen making up roughly 55% of these units today, Russia has a goal of making all units staffed with only professional servicemen in the near future.[XI]. STEPANAKERT – Russian peacekeeping forces in Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh) have deployed the advanced RB-341V “Leer-3” electronic warfare system. Indeed, Moscow is placing renewed emphasis on “information warfare” to mold the human terrain of a conflict zone in its favor. These hacking and disinformation campaigns have high possible rewards, and are done at limited risk to Russia because Western adversaries’ open political systems constrain their ability to retaliate. [13] Russia's investment in its electronic, cyber and information capabilities should concern NATO states. In these conflicts, the U.S. was able to quickly gain local air, sea, and land superiority with relatively low risk to its armed forces. [XIX] While the Kremlin has long been experimenting in the realm of EW, the U.S. has only just re-entered the game. Anti-access/area-denial weapons may target Western forces’ air and logistical support: Western militaries have come to expect on-call air support and medical evacuation. While the propaganda generated by low-level sources may be contradictory, it still plays up the same general themes (“Western society is on the verge of collapse,” “there are no Russian forces in Ukraine” and so on), helping mold international opinion to Moscow’s preferred narratives. The Borisoglebsk 2 is a mobile system. Borisoglebsk 2. [XXVI] The head of US Special Operations Command, General Raymond Thomas, called Syria “the most aggressive EW environment on the planet from our adversaries. Russian-supported forces using drone spotters have delivered deadly artillery fires against Ukrainian formations on the move that inflicted over a hundred casualties in one attack. Cong. [VIII] Timothy Thomas, 2016, Russian Military Strategy: Impacting 21st Century Reform and Geopolitics. Russian Electronic Warfare, Cyber and Information Operations in Ukraine: Implications for NATO and Security in the Baltic States Duncan McCrory RUSI Journal, 24 February 2021 Cyber, Russia, Information, Technology. [XIII] Another system commonly used by Russia is the Moskva-1, the nerve center for Russia’s air defenses and other electronic countermeasure systems. They also help paint a veneer of political legitimacy to Russian military operations. [XIV] This system monitors electronic emissions within a 400 km range in real time on all frequency ranges, carrying out electronic intelligence-gathering and conducting jamming and electronic suppression whenever needed. BEIRUT, LEBANON (8:45 P.M.) – The Turkish drones used against the Syrian Armed Forces ran into some major problems during their campaign over northwestern Syria, the Russian publication Avia.Pro said.. While self-propelled artillery vehicles can accompany troops on offensive maneuvers, in general the Russian military now seeks to keep the enemy at arm’s length from its frontline positions so that the artillery can blast enemy troops without hitting friendly forces. [XXI] Freedberg, 2018, “Electronic Warfare Trumps Cyber”, [XXII] Collins, 2018, “Russia Gives Lessons in Electronic Warfare.”, [XXIII] Freedberg, 2018, “Electronic Warfare Trumps Cyber”. 115th Cong. Countries like Russia and the U.S. are concerned about EW because key objectives like gaining air superiority greatly depend on achieving EW supremacy. Russia s Electronic Warfare III Russia s Electronic Warfare I Executive Summary • Russia’s Armed Forces’ electronic warfare (EW) capability development will pose a serious challenge to the proper planning and execution of NATO’s defence of the Baltic states, and NATO’s entire Eastern Flank, in the event of a Russian assault. [VI] While Russia’s ground forces made gains against the Georgian army, its air force was unable to suppress Georgia’s air defense systems through jamming efforts, resulting in the loss of numerous Russian aircraft. At the operational level, Russia has moved away from a force organized around large divisions to smaller but still well-rounded brigades — though the divisional echelon may soon be reemphasized to ease administrative burdens. The U.S. has spent nearly two decades dedicated to counterterrorism operations where it enjoyed significant qualitative and quantitative advantages over adversaries. April 22, 20210. While there are numerous systems dedicated to EW at the disposal of the Russian Armed Forces, several stick out from the rest. Russian-supported forces deploy lots of snipers: Back in World War II, the Russian military famously made extensive use of snipers to degrade enemy morale and eliminate key unit leaders. Finally, electronic support are actions that search for, intercept, identify, and locate sources of EM emissions for the purpose of enabling the previous two functions. [IV] It is employed to support military operations in three ways: electronic attack, electronic protection, and electronic support. Even though the aforesaid statements may, in some dimension, be propagandist in their nature, considering the wide range of efforts undertaken within that scope, they are probably justified. Every two or three weeks, the latest Russian electronic warfare (EW) systems are featuring in the texts of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) reports. However, a weakness of Russian artillery is its centralized command-and-control structure, which makes it difficult for frontline troops to request fire missions. Interest in this arose back in the 1980s as part of a large-scale effort to develop countermeasures against America’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), which was aimed at forming a space-based shield against incoming Soviet missiles. [I] However, as the U.S. turns toward near-peer competition, the days of permissive deployments are quickly coming to an end. By contrast, Russian forces are not accustomed to assuming air superiority — this was true even during victorious campaigns late in World War II — and thus have invested heavily in a diverse array of anti-aircraft systems, from short-range man-portable surface-to-air missiles and anti-aircraft vehicles at the battalion level to “strategic” S-300 or S-400 missiles that can threaten aircraft hundreds of miles away. Russian EW is found throughout every arm and branch of service, making it nearly impossible to avoid. [XII] Thomas, 2016, Russian Military Strategy, p. 157. During the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, Russian EW capabilities were limited. Restoring America’s position as team captain: Why international cooperation is in the nation’s best interest. [VII] Learning from this experience, Russia has since prioritized investing in EW tools, with Russian President Vladimir Putin ordering at least 70% of all Russian EW equipment modernized by 2020. Leer-2 VPK-233114 Development of the system started in 2004 and evaluation testing successfully completed in December 2010. A Publication of the Georgetown University Center for Security Studies. [X] Still, the overall number of soldiers serving in EW units is relatively low, as they must undergo specialist training to become proficient in all EW tools. By Drago Bosnic On Nov 16, 2020. Photo Credit: RIA Novosti. This approach has been inspired in part by Western engagement with allied proxies in conflicts ranging from Vietnam to Libya and Afghanistan. Electronic warfare threatens dependence on communications and sensors. To be clear, the document doesn’t set out to paint the Russian military as an indomitable juggernaut. As assessed by Roger McDermott, the Russian EW forces are well-equipped, well-coordinated, and well-integrated with other combat arms like air defense and artillery. 2nd sess. In Ukraine, the wide-scale adoption of drones has reportedly been a “game changer” in the effectiveness of artillery. [XII] The Borisoglebsk-2 is most notable for the role it played in eastern Ukraine, allegedly impeding the use of Ukrainian drones by suppressing incoming GPS signals. Without it, an adversary can disrupt and degrade the navigation systems on precision guided munitions (PGMs) and cause missiles to go off course, as well as suppress a country’s air defense systems through jamming. As told by Laurie Buckhour, a retired Army colonel, “All of a sudden your communications won’t work, or you can’t call for fire, or you can’t warn of incoming fires because your radars have been jammed and they can’t detect anything.”[XXVIII], Considering the wide range of efforts undertaken by Russia to improve its own EW capabilities relative to its Western counterparts, the U.S. will need to work-perhaps for the first time-on regaining unchallenged dominance in a domain of operations. A Russian R-330Zh Zhitel electronic warfare system, which is used to jam cellular satellite communications and is among the many electronic warfare platfroms Russia has deployed to … InformNapalm volunteers , in their turn, closely monitor this type of data and look for visual evidence that can give a better understanding of the purpose and logic behind a particular type of military hardware being in a certain area. By contrasts, Russia’s authoritarian structure silences political opposition and independent media outlets that could undermine information campaigns, and projects a philosophy of universal cynicism to instill doubt in counterpropaganda. ), p. 50. [XXX] While the Navy is doing slightly better than the other services, possessing aircraft such as the EA-18G Growler electronic attack plane, the Army and Air Force have largely allowed their EW expertise atrophy. While each system individually has its limitation, they are designed to overlap into an integrated network that can only be dismantled with great care. Despite progress in professionalizing, the Russian military remains largely made up of conscripts who, after four months of basic training, only serve for another eight before a new group of fresh recruits is rotated in. Russian opinion-makers are continuously stressing the fact that in the area of Electronic Warfare, the Russian forces still have a great advantage over their western counterparts. Finally, a notable tool in Russia’s EW kit similar to the Krasukha-2 is Russia’s ability to spoof signals. Such an effort will inevitably be colored by analysts’ cultural biases and worldviews, as well as a degree of paranoia intrinsic to the military profession. Foreign Military Studies Office, p. 153. Washington, GPO, 2018 (statement of Jim Thomas, Principal and Co-Founder of the Telemus Group. However, Russian electronic-warfare batteries wield a multitude of systems to jam or spy upon frontline communication systems — including radio, cellular, satellite and even GPS. While jamming Ukrainian communications, Russia’s own drones would triangulate the sources of electronic emissions to find targets. In the face the increased threat posed by Russia, the United States must focus on improving its electronic warfare capabilities. Moreover, all of Russia’s combat arms are well-honed from years of electronic combat experience. Moscow uses cyberwarfare and information operations for offensive ends: Moscow has invested to an unparalleled degree in an information-warfare apparatus designed to manipulate foreign public opinion and break into adversary computer systems for both political and military ends. “Divnomorye” is a breakthrough development of Russian scientists and designers. Once targets were located and confirmed, an overwhelming artillery barrage would be called in. Russian electronic warfare (EW) has attracted an unusual amount of attention in recent years, most notably because of the well-documented presence, and use, of new Russian EW equipment in eastern Ukraine—and also since 2015 in Syria. Russia has committed billions of rubles to advancing its EW capabilities for use in conflicts against NATO nations, according to a recent think-tank report. EW has become a common buzzword in the defense community, though it is not always well understood. The goal is to emit “noise” in an over-powered signal strong enough to overload the adversary’s receivers. [XV] However, a unique feature is its capacity to provide a false target once the system has been jammed, leading the aircraft to fly away from its original target, protecting Russian forces from attack. Russian military relies on artillery to destroy enemy formations: Russia’s fondness for the “god of war” dates back several centuries, and according to the guide, Russian tactics still emphasize artillery as a decisive instrument for destroying enemy formations, while maneuver units handle mopping up the survivors. In the last decades, Moscow has reinvested in elite sniper units by acquiring modern sniper rifles, suppressors, ammunition and sights from Western sources, as well as producing its own deadly T-5000 sniper rifle. Russia has signed a contract to supply an unspecified number of Orlan-10E surveillance drones to Myanmar as part of a deal that also includes Pantsir-S1 surface-to-air missile systems and radar equipment. [XXIV] In fact, the U.S. only started engaging in offensive EW in the Middle East within the last few years, shutting down enemy radios so they cannot communicate or call in reinforcements. “Electronic Warfare — Myths and Facts — Part I” “How unique are Russian Army EW systems?” “Recently Russian electronic warfare systems have acquired the aura of some kind of super weapon, capable, according to average opinion, of causing panic in … [XVII] In general, an actor conducts spoofing by relaying false positioning information to an adversary. The guide suggests only two tactical responses — either disengage immediately, even at the likely cost of some casualties, to avoid getting hit by an artillery strike, or to reply with accurate sniper or heavy-weapons fire. Today, Russian EW has become a developed, mature technology that continues to advance. electronic warfare capabilities. Remarkably, it is Russia that presents some of the stiffest competition, with increasing agreement among experts in the field that Russia has taken a huge, and somewhat unexpected, leap forward in its EW capabilities. Modern Russian units are evolving into smaller, more flexible formations: The new basic Russian military unit is the Battalion Tactical Group, which can be tailored for specific missions by the addition of anti-aircraft, electronic-warfare and artillery units. For a reverse example, Russia’s concept of “hybrid warfare,” or the so-called Gerasimov doctrine — a term used to describe a blend of conventional and irregular warfare as well as political and cyber warfare — was actually coined to describe what the Russian military perceived as Western military tactics. In Ukraine, Russia’s extensive electronic warfare activities use unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and ground systems to conduct electromagnetic reconnaissance and jamming against satellite, cellular and radio communication systems along with GPS spoofing and electronic warfare attacks against Ukrainian UAVs. Most concerning are the growing capabilities of adversaries in the realm of electronic warfare (EW). C4iSR. For example, during an interview in 2015, Hodges said Russia demonstrated the ability to completely shut down “everything” used by the Ukrainians for … However, Russian electronic-warfare batteries wield a multitude of systems to jam or spy upon frontline communication systems — including radio, cellular, satellite and even GPS. [XXXII] However, no one aircraft will allow the U.S. to successfully compete against all aspects of Russia’s EW capabilities. Indeed, the US Army has almost no EW capability, whereas Russia’s most powerful EW capabilities reside within its land forces.[XXXI]. Awareness of an adversary’s methods may be key to prevailing in a military conflict — or, more desirably, avoiding one in the first place. The Russian Ministry of Defense conducted exercises on the use of long-range electronic warfare systems. While Russian air-defense networks are not invincible, a Western adversary would likely only be able to count on sporadic air support, at least initially, due to the density of the anti-air threat. Moscow has long been wielding more and bigger guns as a means to compensate for its forces’ qualitatively inferior training. The use of sophisticated types of modern military equipment, however, clearly hints at who is behind the registered attacks. Whereas Western militaries increasingly use artillery to launch precision strikes against enemy positions, the Russian army still values large-scale area bombardments with overwhelming volumes of firepower, especially from deadly multiple rocket-launcher systems such as the BM-30 Smerch. The electronic warfare system is known as “Belladonna”, a poisonous plant that gets its name from Renaissance women who used its extract for tinctures to dilate the pupils of their eyes, ostensibly to make them more attractive. • Following failures of Russian electronic warfare efforts during the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, Russia has concentrated on sharpening its capabilities in the electromagnetic spectrum. [XXXIII] After a 25-year hiatus from near-peer competition, the U.S. is now entering a new age of warfare, and bridging the EW capability gap will be of utmost priority. Space-based electronic warfare. Fitting perfectly into Russian military doctrine and its preference for blurring the lines between war and peace, EW allows Russia to engage in “non-contact operations” that jam, blind, disrupt, and demoralize an enemy without having to fire a single shot. In Ukraine, Russian-supported forces deployed a variety of anti-aircraft systems that shot down Frogfoot attack jets, helicopter transports and gunships and even a fully loaded cargo plane, eventually forcing the Ukrainian air force to stop providing tactical air support.
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